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Abstract
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have the ability to integrate with other networks while providing a fast
and cost-saving deployment. The network security is one of important challenge problems in this kind of
networks. This paper is focused on key management between mesh and sensor networks. We propose an
ecient key pre-distribution scheme based on two polynomials in wireless mesh networks by employing
the nature of heterogeneity. Our scheme realizes the property of bloom lters, i.e., neighbor nodes can
discover their shared keys but have no knowledge on the dierent keys possessed by the other node,
without the probability of false positive. The analysis presented in this paper shows that our scheme
has the ability to establish three dierent security level keys and achieves the property of self adaptive
security for sensor networks with acceptable computation and communication consumption.
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1 Introduction
Due to the public's demands of connection with anyone at anywhere and anytime, many kinds
of network technologies have been brought forward recently. As shown in Fig. 1, wireless mesh
networks have the ability to integrate with other networks such as the Internet, WiFi networks,
Ad hoc networks and sensor networks [1]. The focus of this paper is on the key management only
between wireless mesh networks and wireless sensor networks. Due to the broadcast nature of
mesh networks, most of them are deployed in hostile environments where communication security
is at risk. To secure the communication, encryption techniques are employed in wireless mesh
networks. Thus, how to eciently manage the related key is of great importance to the security
of wireless mesh networks. In this paper, we will propose an ecient key management scheme by
taking advantage of the nature of heterogeneous.
Wireless sensor networks consist of large amount of sensor nodes, which are low cost, battery
powered, and have limited computation ability. To secure the communication, various key man-
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agement schemes have been proposed so far. Because of power and computation limitations,
asymmetric key cryptographic algorithm is considered infeasible for wireless sensor networks [2].
Eschenauer and Gligor proposed a key pre-distribution scheme [3] based on symmetric encryption.
Chan et al. extended their idea to a q-composite random key pre-distribution scheme [4], with
the improvement that neighbor nodes can establish a common key only if they share at least q
keys.
Fig. 1: Interconnection between mesh networks and other networks
There exist other key management mechanisms in sensor networks. Blom proposed Matrix
based pairwise key management protocol [5], which is improved by Du [6]. Liu et al. proposed
polynomial-based protocols [7], and we also introduced T-packing design and proposed cover-free
family based key management strategy [8]. However, there exists either scalability or security
problems in existing proposals. The scheme to be proposed in this paper can achieve good perfor-
mance on both security and scalability with acceptable energy consumption in sensor networks.
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) consist of mesh nodes, which are equipped with higher energy
and larger transmission radius compared with sensor nodes. As a result, asymmetric key cryp-
tographic algorithm is feasible in mesh networks. However, both mesh nodes and sensor nodes
may be corrupted by the adversary, which deserves special attention in the design of security
mechanisms.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on related works. Preliminar-
ies are introduced in Section 3. We present our scheme in Section 4 and the analysis in Section 5.
The conclusion is given in Section 6.
2 Related Works
In this section, we rst review related works on key pre-distribution schemes. Then, we will show
limitations of those schemes and the motivation of our paper.
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Eschenauer and Gligor rst proposed a random key pre-distribution scheme [3]. The scheme
in [3] consists of three phases, namely key pre-distribution, shared key discovery, and path key
establishment. In key pre-distribution phase, system randomly selects r keys and identiers from
previously generated large key pool P for each sensor node and establishes key rings. In shared
key discovery phase, neighbor nodes can establish a session key as long as they broadcast the
list of key identiers and nd shared key(s). In path key establishment phase, neighbor nodes
establish a session key if they do not share any key after shared key discovery phase. They will
search two or more links between them and establish a path key with the help of those links.
As shown in [3], the costs of Eschenauer and Gligor scheme are lower than others'. However,
dierent links in Eschenauer and Gligor scheme may share the same key, and thus the security
of other links may at risk if a sensor node is captured. To solve this problem, Chan et al.
proposed a q-composite random key pre-distribution scheme [4]. The dierence compared with
the prior is that neighbor nodes can establish a session key only if they share at least q common
identiers. Security weakness in Eschenauer and Gligor scheme can be improved when employing
this method. Nevertheless, there exist constrains between key pool size P and the parameter q.
Chan proposed another key management scheme for ad hoc networks [9]. In his proposal, all
sensor nodes select r keys. When neighbor node i and j need to establish a session key, node i
constructs a polynomial fsi(x) = (x Ki1)(x Ki2)    (x Kir) = xr+Ar 1xr 1+   +A1x+A0
using r keys it stored, encrypts coecients of polynomial Eki(A0); Eki(A0);    ; Eki(Ar 1) (ki
is only known by node i) and sends them to neighbor node j. Neighbor node j can compute
yw = Eki(fsi(Kjw)) using own r keys by employing properties of privacy homomorphism and
sends r results to source node, after that they can nd shared keys between them.
In our previous work, we proposed an ecient and resilient shared-key discovery protocol in
wireless sensor networks [10]. Our design makes the use of privacy homomorphism and bloom
lter in key management. When neighbor nodes A and B need to establish a session key, node
A generates a random number w, encrypts it using its secret key KA, and sends EKA(w) to
node B. Upon receiving EKA(w), Node B hashes all it stored r keys and obtains a vector u
(constructing a bloom lter). Then node B computes and replies A with EKA(wu) by employing
properties of privacy homomorphism. A can decrypt it and nd shared keys between them. Since
bloom lter has the probability of false positive (more details will be given in section 3.1), it may
introduce security problems. Furthermore, existing schemes proposed by Chan and Shen et al.
are infeasible for energy constrained sensor networks (Energy consumption is non-trivial since
intercommunication is needed when establishing a session key between sensor nodes).
Our contribution
Our scheme possesses the following properties: neighbor nodes can know shared keys between
them but does not have any knowledge on their dierent keys; dierent links establish dierent
keys in key pre-distribution scheme; the proposed scheme successfully solves the energy constraint
issue in sensor networks by establishing robust networks with low energy consumption; our scheme
can achieve self adaptive security in wireless mesh networks. Nodes can employ dierent security
level keys according to the importance of transmitted messages.
3 Preliminaries
This section gives a brief introduction on the preliminaries required by this paper.
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3.1 Polynomial fsi(x)
Bloom lter is a bit string [10, 11, 12, 13], used to verify if some keys are in the database in key
discovery phase. It is constructed by s hash functions h1; h2;    ; hs that map keys into m bits
for representing a set S = fK1; K2;    ; Kng of n keys. Initially all m bits are set to 0. For each
key K 2 S, the bits hi(K) are set to 1 for 1  i  s. A location may be needed to set to 1 more
than once, but only the rst change has an eect. To tell if a key is in the database, one only
needs to calculate s hash functions and verify if all hi(K) are set to 1.
         
         
         













H1(key) = key mod 17
H2(key) = key mod 13 + 4
Fig. 2: False positive example of a bloom lter
Taking advantage of this technical, we can verify if some keys are in bloom lter, but have no
knowledge about other keys the bloom lter owns. However, bloom lter has the probability of
false positive, which means that some keys are not in bloom lter may be falsely veried as in it.
Fig. 2 provides an example.
To deal with the probability of false positive, we construct a polynomial: f(x) = (x K 01)+(x 
K
0
2)+   +(x K 0r)+K. We realize that the polynomial can achieve the property of bloom lter
owns without the probability of false positive, namely, when two nodes i and j want to know if they
share the same keys, they only need to send a request, and system constructs polynomials using
keys they stored respectively, e.g., upon receiving the request, system constructs two polynomials
fsi(x) and fsj(x) (fsi(x) = (x K 0i1) + (x K 0i2) +   + (x K 0ir) +Kpi), K 0iu(u = 1; 2;    ; r) is
hash value of key stored in sensor node i. fsj(x) is constructed in a similar way) and broadcasts
them. On receiving i's polynomial, node j computes if fsi(K
0
ju) = Kpi using keys it stored. i and
j can establish session key by employing this method (We also realize that j has the ability to




i2;    ; K 0iw of dierent keys sensor node i owns, but does not have
any knowledge about corresponding keys Ki1; Ki2;    ; Kiw due to one-way hash function).
Note that the transmission consumption of the polynomial is higher compared with that of
Bloom lter. In our paper, this issue can be alleviated by taking advantage of the heterogeneous
nature in wireless mesh networks. More details are given in Section 4.2.
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3.2 Notations and network assumptions
3.2.1 Notations
The notations in this paper are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Notations in this paper
n The number of sensor nodes need to be deployed
IDi Identier of node i
Ksi Independent key for each sensor node i; i = 0; 1; 2;    ; n
Kij keys in the key pool of P , i = 0; 1; 2;    ; n, j = 0; 1; 2;    ; r,
represent the jth key of sensor node i's
fsi(x) The polynomial system constructed from the keys stored in node i
Kpi The independent key system generated for polynomial fsi(x)
mi The element of Hash chain, where i = 0; 1; 2;    ; h,
which is used for sensor and mesh nodes to verify the validity of com-
mands





There are two assumptions in our scheme.
(1) There are three category participants in our networks, namely system, mesh nodes and
sensor nodes. We assume that the system is secure absolutely, while both mesh and sensor nodes
are not physically secure. It means that secret information may be compromised by the adversary
when mesh or sensor nodes are captured. While it is often assumed that nodes are equipped with
tamper-detection technology and they can erase secret information when captured. In our paper
we will address the security issues of networks when this assumption cannot be satised; and
(2) The sensor area is covered by mesh nodes' wireless transmission radius.
4 A Highly Ecient Key Pre-distribution Scheme in
Wireless Mesh Networks
Our protocol consists of the following phases:
Key pre-distribution phase: System distributes private and public keys for each mesh node,
and generates n keys Ksi, n nodes identiers and a large pool of P keys, denoted by Kij and
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their key identiers. System stores r keys for each sensor node selected randomly from key pool
P , and generates polynomials fsi(x) = (x K 0i1)(x K 0i2)    (x K 0ir) +Kpi using r keys of each
sensor node. Then system generates mh, calculates mh 1 = Hash(mh) delivers h times can gain
a hash chain mh;mh 1;    ;m0. After key pre-distribution phases, mesh nodes store its private
and public keys, all polynomials fsi(x), and m0; each sensor node stores its node identify, Ksi, r
keys, r key identiers, and m0.
4.1 Key management between mesh nodes
Once deployed, each mesh node broadcasts its public key, and each mesh node records public
keys it received from neighbor nodes and rebroadcasts them. After this phase, all mesh nodes'
public keys are known by others, and they can communicate with each other using their public
key based security mechanisms. Then mesh nodes deliver the manager and recorder selection
algorithm. In mesh networks, the duty of manager is to coordinate both sensor and mesh nodes'
behaviors and the duty of recorder is to record all sensor nodes' location related information. The
employ of function nodes will increase the eciency of wireless mesh networks.
4.2 Key management between sensor nodes
Shared key discovery phase: After sensor nodes deployment, all nodes execute following steps.
Step 1 The rst step. Each sensor node broadcasts its node identier, registers all identiers
of neighbors' in its memory, and sinks its location related information to mesh recorder.
Step 2 The second step. System sends m1 to mesh nodes encrypted with mesh nodes' public
keys and orders them to broadcast polynomials.
Step 3 The third step. Mesh nodes check m0 = Hash(m1) and replace m0 with m1. Then
mesh nodes broadcast fm1; fsi(x); C = EK0pi(HELLO)g. Here, K
0
pi is the hash of Kpi, and
C = EK0pi
(HELLO) is a verication message encrypted using K
0
pi.
Step 4 The last step. On receiving those messages, all sensor nodes check m0 = Hash(m1),
store m1 and establish session key with their neighbors. For example, node i and j know
they are neighbor nodes after Step 1. Upon receiving the broadcast messages, they verify if
m0 = Hash(m1). If so, they store m1 and delete m0 from their memory. Then node j uses its
neighbor node i's polynomial, computes fsi(K
0
jz) using hash value of all r keys he stored, and
checks if Dfsi(K0jz)
0 (C) = HELLO. It then uses all the shared keys Kja; Kjb;    ; Kjy and Kpi
to generate a session key.
Note that each polynomial has an independent Kpi, which leads to a unique session key. After
that, both nodes i and j can establish session key. The hash chain enables mesh and sensor nodes
to verify the validity of messages. After this phase, all sensor nodes should renew the r keys
they stored respectively. A feasible method is to hash and get R = Hash(HELLO), compute
newKiz = Hash(Kiz R) for z = 1; 2;    ; r.
Direct session keys establish phase: After shared key discovery phase, most of session
keys have been established between neighbor nodes. It may occur that neighbor nodes A and B
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do not have any shared keys while they need to establish a session key for later communication.
In this case, they rst need to send a request to mesh nodes by multi-hop ways. Mesh recorder
nodes check if they are real neighbors, and forward the request to system. System generates a
polynomial f(x) = (x K 0sA)(x K 0sB)+KAB and sends m2 and f(x) to mesh nodes. Mesh nodes
downwards it to sensor nodes. Upon receiving the messages, sensor nodes check m1 = Hash(m2)
and replace m1 with m2. Then node A computes f(K
0
sA) = KAB and node B can also gains KAB.
Later, both A and B can communicate with each other using this session key.
We realize that our scheme have the ability to establish pairwise keys for each pair of neighbor
nodes, if system generates these polynomials f(x) = (x   K 0si)(x   K 0sj) + Kij for each pair of
neighbor nodes i and j. Figure 3 shows the consumption comparison of two polynomials based
on the security and energy consumption.
Group key establish phase: Some situations may need group communication. We realize
it is ecient for a source node to broadcast messages to other group members using group key.
When needed, source node sends request fGRP : NIDS ; ID1; ID2;    ; IDWg. System checks the
request and generates a group key polynomial f(x) = (x K 0s1)(x K 0s2)    (x K 0sw)+KG; K 0si; i =
1; 2;    ; w is the hash value of group members independent key. Group members can establish
group key KG when they receive this polynomial.
Our scheme has the ability of self-adaptive security. We can encrypt messages using keys of
dierent security level. The lowest security level key is group key, and communication will become
insecure whenever a member of the group is captured. The modest security level key is session key.
Since all polynomials are broadcasted in plaintext, a communication link may become insecure
if adversary captures some nodes on that link and knows enough key information. However,
this will not have any negative impact on other links whose keys are independently chosen and
established from polynomials f(x) = (x   K 0si)(x   K 0sj) + Kij. These keys are called pairwise
keys, and they are considered as the keys with the highest secure level. When needed, nodes can
employ those dierent security level keys according to the importance of transmitted messages.
5 Analysis
This section provides the analysis on the proposed protocol.
5.1 Performance analysis
Revocation: Whenever a sensor node is captured by the adversary, system sends mi, node i-
dentiers, r key identiers and a revocation order to mesh nodes. Mesh nodes broadcast those
revocation messages. On receiving the revocation messages, each sensor node veries and stores
mi, and deletes the keys corresponding to the broadcasted key identiers. If the node identier
is its neighbor's, it should remove the corresponding session key. After this operation, some links
may disappear, and some nodes may need to establish session keys. This can be achieved using
the direct session key establish phase.
Scalability: New nodes may be added into the networks when needed. Before nodes are deployed
into networks, system stores Ksj, node identier, mi, Kj1; Kj2;    ; Kjr and r key identiers into
the memory of sensor node j. After node deployment, they can establish session keys with their
neighbors as described in shared key discovery phase or direct session key establish phase (Note
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that the consumption of two methods is dierent, and more details will be given in Section 5.2).
Regeneration: regeneration is needed in the case of key expiration. Neighbor nodes can regen-
erate their session key using direct session key establish phase described before.
5.2 Energy consumption
Denition of two situations:
Situation 1: New sensor nodes are added to sensor networks and most of them need to
establish session keys with existing sensor nodes.
Situation 2: New sensor nodes are added to sensor networks and most of them need to
establish session keys between themselves.
In our paper, we construct two polynomials to establish session keys for sensor nodes. We
analyze the expected transmission bits of two polynomials in two situations.
Polynomial 1: f(x) = (x K 0i1)(x K 0i2)    (x K 0ir) +Kpi = xr +Cr 1xr 1 +   +C1x+C0.
When broadcast, mesh nodes need to transmit C0; C1;    ; Cr 1. Take AES-128 as an example,
the length of key is 128 bits, and each Ci is also 128 bits. So the expected transmission bits
introduced by polynomial 1 are r  128  n = r  128  1000 bits. Here, the number of sensor
nodes n = 1000, and r is the number of selected keys each sensor node has in the memory.
Polynomial 2: f(x) = (x K 0si)(x K 0sj) +Kij = x2+C1x+C0. When broadcast, mesh nodes








and mesh nodes need to broadcast n(n 1)
2
 2  128 = 1000999
2
 2  128 bits. Figure 3 shows
comparison of two polynomials' expected transmission bits.






















P1:transmission bits of polynomial 1 when 1000 sensor nodes
P2:transmission bits of polynomial 2 when 1000 sensor nodes
Fig. 3: Comparison of two polynomials' expected transmission bits vs. the size of key ring
As shown in the analysis, expected transmission bits of polynomial 1 is growing linearly as the
number of key ring r, when the number of sensor nodes n is xed. In contrary, transmission
bits of polynomial 2 are constant in the same situation. According to Eschenauer and Gligor's
analysis, to achieve the probability p = 0:5 of any two nodes share a key in their key ring, 75 keys
are stored in sensor node when the number of sensor nodes are 10000, and 250 keys are stored
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in sensor node when the number of sensor nodes are 100000. Just as our intuition, mesh nodes
should broadcast polynomial 1 when sensor nodes are deployed in large quantities in situation 2.


























P1:20 keys are stored in sensor node
P1:40 keys are stored in sensor node
P1:60 keys are stored in sensor node
P1:75 keys are stored in sensor node
P1:100 keys are stored in sensor node
P1:150 keys are stored in sensor node
P1:200 keys are stored in sensor node
P1:250 keys are stored in sensor node
P1:300 keys are stored in sensor node
Fig. 4: Expected transmission bits of two polynomials when situation 1 happened
When new nodes are added to existing sensor networks and situation 1 occurs, the expected
transmission bits of broadcasting two polynomials are mainly aected by the number of expected
neighbors x. For polynomial 1, the expected transmission bits are r 128 (x+1) bits, and r is
the size of key ring. For polynomial 2, the expected transmission bits are 2 128 (x+ 1) bits.
We present the comparison in Figure 4.
Figure 4 shows that the transmission bits of broadcasting two polynomials increase with the
expected number of neighbors. Furthermore, the transmission bits increase with the number of
keys stored in sensor memory. Figure 4 shows that in situation 1, mesh nodes should broadcast
polynomial 2 for energy eciency.
When new nodes are added to existing sensor networks and situation 2 occurs, the expected
transmission bits of broadcasting two polynomials are mainly aected by the number of newly
added sensor nodes x. For polynomial 1, the expected transmission bits are r  128  128 bits,
and for polynomial 2, the expected transmission bits are C2x  128 2 = x(x  1) 128 bits. We
assume there are 75 keys stored in sensor memory. Figure 5 shows that when the number of new
nodes is less than or equal to 76, mesh nodes should broadcast polynomial 2 for energy eciency,
and should broadcast polynomial 1 when the number is greater than 76.
5.3 Resilience against node capture
As described before, both sensor nodes and mesh nodes may be deployed into hostile environment,
and all key information may be compromised by adversaries once captured. We can see that when
node i is captured, adversary knows nothing about other links between non-captured nodes due
to the use of polynomial fsi(x), which means that adversary cannot retrieve other session keys
without enough information of key pool. After the phase of shared key discovery, each sensor
node will renew all r keys it has. After that, even adversary captures enough sensor nodes, non-
comprised links are always secure because of the independence of session keys. In other words,
networks can work well in spite of the number of compromised sensor nodes. Another potential
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Fig. 5: Expected transmission bits of two polynomials when situation 2 happened
security risk is that mesh nodes are captured by adversaries. We can see that adversaries can learn
nothing but polynomials fsi(x). Even if the adversary is powerful enough that he can compromise
some mesh nodes and sensor nodes synchronously, he can not break the security of our networks.
5.4 Resilience against node replication
In our scheme, the recorder is selected in mesh nodes, and its duty is to record related informa-
tion about sensor nodes' location. In shared key discovery phase, sensor nodes sink their location
related information to mesh recorder node. Thus, when replicated nodes are deployed into net-
works, mesh recorder can detect them (either their location information is wrong or the node has
existed). So our scheme is resilient against node replication.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a polynomial-based key pre-distribution scheme in wireless mesh
networks. In mesh networks, mesh nodes are equipped with high energy, while sensor nodes are
energy constrained. However, both mesh and sensor nodes are not physically secure. Taking
advantage of characteristics of heterogeneous wireless mesh networks, our scheme can provide
highly ecient key management by employing two polynomials. Our scheme realizes several
desirable properties, including (1) neighbor nodes can know shared keys between themselves
without any knowledge about dierent keys; (2) The scheme support independent keys between
dierent links with low energy consumption in sensor networks; and (3) our scheme can achieve
self-adaptive security.
It is estimated that the cost of transmit 1 bit is more than that of delivering 3000 times
computer instruction in [14]. In our scheme, the expect transmission bits of sensor nodes are kept
in a relatively low level with the help of mesh nodes, while the computation consumption is large
(but still acceptable) since each sensor node needs to check if f(K
0
i) = K using all keys in its
memory. In our future work, we will investigate and design new mechanisms to achieve highly
ecient key management with low energy consumption.
Y. Zhang et al. /Journal of Computational Information Systems 8: 6 (2012) 2539{2549 2549
References
[1] Ian F. Akyildiz, Xudong Wang, and Weilin Wang, Wireless Mesh Networks: a survey, Computer
Networks, March 2005, Volume 47, issue 4, pages 445 { 487.
[2] A. S Wander and N Gura, and H Eberle, Energy Analysis of Public Key Cryptography for Wireless
Sensor Networks [C], proc of the 3rd IEEE Int'l Conf on Pervasive Computing and communications,
2005.
[3] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, A Key-Management Scheme for Distributed Sensor Networks,
Proceeding of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security, Washington,
DC, 2002, pp. 41 { 47.
[4] H. Chan, A. Perrig and D.Song, Random Key Pre-distribution Schemes for Sensor Networks, IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003, pp, 197 { 213.
[5] R Blom, An Optimal Class of Symmetric Key Generation System, Advances in Cryptology: Pro-
ceedings of Eurocrypt 84, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 209, Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
1984: 335 { 338.
[6] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, P. K. Varshney, J. Katz and A. Khalili, A Pairwise key pre-distribution
Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks, ACM Transactions on Information and System Security,
Vol. 8, No. 1, 2005, pp. 228 { 258.
[7] D. Liu, P. Ning and K. Sun, Ecient Self-Healing Group Key Distr5ibution with Revocation
Capability, Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
Washington, DC, 2003, pp. 231 { 240.
[8] Li Xu, Jianwei Chen and Xiaoding Wang, Cover-Free Family based Ecient Group Key Manage-
ment Strategy in Wireless Sensor Network, Journal of Communications, Vol. 3, No. 6, No. 2008.
pp. 51 { 58.
[9] A. C-F Chan, Distributed Symmetric Key Management for Mobile Ad hoc Networks [c], Proceeding
of the INFOCOM 2004, Twenty Cthird Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and
Communications Societies, 2004, 4 (4): 2414 { 2424.
[10] Jin-bo Shen, Li Xu, and Jianwei Chen, Ecient and Resilient Shared-key Discovery Protocol in
Wireless Sensor Networks, Computer Applications, Vol. 28, No. 11, Nov. 2008, pp. 2817 { 2819,
2823.
[11] B Bloom, Space/time Tradeos in Hash Coding with Allowable Errors, Communications of the
ACM, 1997, 13 (7), pp. 422 { 426.
[12] M Mitzenmacher. Cpmpressed Bloom Filters, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2002, pp.
604 { 612.
[13] A Broder and M Mitzenmacher, Network Applications of Bloom Filters: A Survey [J], Internet
Math, 2003, 1 (4): 485 { 509.
[14] Ian F. Akyildiz, W. Su, and Y. Sankarasubramaniam, A Survey on Sensor Networks [J], IEEE
Communications Magazine, 2002, 40 (8): 102 { 114.
